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Preface
BY JUDGE ScoTr REED*
Very few people read prefaces. That clich6 comforts me
because I have not read the articles that comprise the issue of
the Law Journal in which this preface will appear. Therefore,
as the self appointed pundits who write letters to the editor
fulminating about appellate opinions they have not read and as
the law student who, after a one semester exposure to criminal
law, writes a law journal note learnedly expounding about how
a court was blinded by "technicalities" but forgot "justice," I
will blithely proceed to comment though in a thoroughly unin-
formed condition.
Having spent twenty years in the practice of law, about eight
years in law teaching, five years on the bench of a trial court of
general jurisdiction, and three years and five months as a judge
on the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, I claim the right to inflict
upon the unwary reader of prefaces my purely personal reactions
to the foreboding question encircled by the majestic title of this
issue: "Symposium on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform.".
The Kentucky Court of Appeals is the court of last resort of
this Commonwealth and is the only appellate court to which
appeals from the trial courts of general jurisdiction are addressed.
The Supreme Courts of our sister states, however, are convinced
that we must be an intermediate appellate court; on those rare
occasions when they are driven to mention one of our opinions,
they usually cite it as "Ky. App." There are Kentucky lawyers
and legal scholars who would regard "Ape" a more accurate
designation than "App." probably because "App." might be
mistaken for "Apt." One of my colleagues, nevertheless, opined
that a very important project to accomplish in the "judicial
reform" movement was to assure that our court be renamed the
"Supreme Court of Kentucky" and that our title of office be
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changed from "judge" to "justice." The first element in his recom-
mendation intrigued me because it raised brazen hopes that
we might then more successfully compete and have more of our
decisions selected for the blue paper section of West's advance
sheets; the second element appeared completely unattractive.
"Judge" Learned Hand, even with his unique ideas about consti-
tutional interpretation, evokes in me a greater respect and
reverence for the craft of which I am a member than does "Mr.
Justice" plus any number of names of past jurists who sometimes
hit two baggers but never a home run, to paraphrase Karl
Llewellyn.
I submit that the current workers in the vineyard for "judicial
reform" refuse to pose the foreboding question clearly implicit
in the slogan, "The American justice system is sick nigh on to
death." The question is simply this: Can the United States in
the times in which we live afford the system of justice that has
existed in this republic since its foundation? Please note that at
this point the inquiry is addressed to the system and not to its
components. Although not explicitly articulated, the plain import
of the conclusions of many observers is that we simply can
no longer afford a separate, independent, coordinate branch of
government to act as the dispute resolving mechanism. The end
product of such a system according to these commentators is so
delay ridden and unrealistic and unresponsive that it is no longer
acceptable. The implication of that conclusion to the advocate-
adversary system is so clear that it requires no savant to discern
it.
Judge Traynor in his 1970 address to The American Law
Institute noted that the public attitude toward the judiciary had
changed from indifference to hysteria. What he did not say was
that the response from within the judiciary and the organized
bar, which then conditioned editorialists and reporters, was a
crisis-ridden attack of fever with many unconsciously willing to
throw the baby out with the bath water.
If one admits that the basic system is the fairest the world
has ever known, then the recurrent problem of congestion and
delay, which was enough problem in 1959 to merit a book by
Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, perhaps, should cause examination
of components rather than system. The components of which I
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speak are the judges. With the few exceptions in those states
where a judicial removal commission is provided, there is no
means except by the practically impossible route of impeachment
to rid the system of its components who are too old, too lazy or
too sick to adequately perform, and that condition prevails in
both the federal and state courts. It just may be that at least part
of the cause of the current crisis of public distrust of the system
is the built-in obsolescence of its components.
Again, if it is accepted that the system itself should be pre-
served, a further relevant inquiry is suggested concerning the
components. From the beginning to the present, the predominant
majority of judges have been selected because of partisan political
activity either by the individual himself or at least by his sponsor-
ing friends. When the system is assessed by a public attracted
by "the new populism," when its work is assayed by a generation
distinguished by its refusal to accept absolutes and to examine
in an invariable attitude of inquiring criticism, it should not be
the source of wonder that the aura of public respect which once
attached to the judiciary is no longer with us. The fact that
Democrat presidents and senators usually find that the best
qualified professional for appointment to the federal bench is a
Democrat, and that Republican presidents and senators usually
find that the best qualified professional for appointment to the
federal bench is a Republican, once was glossed over or the act
was dismissed as "just natural." What alienates the more so-
phisticated public of today is the hypocrisy insisted on by the
politicians who publically prate that the whole system is one of
merit selection and that they place "the good of people over
the interest of party." The occasional appointment by a president
of a safe friend of the opposite party to the Supreme Court is
generally regarded as a veneer to disguise the truth of how the
selection process generally works. By like token, any popularly
elected judge who is not interested in the politics involved in
his own reelection is either ready to retire or is striving to achieve
extinction.
When the pragmatist cries we can't sell a method of "real
merit selection" to the people, my reaction is that if this means
the public will not accept a method whereby the judge is a
political appointee for life subject only to impeachment, then I
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agree. It, nevertheless, is the method provided by our federal
Constitution whose strength is in its insistence on independence
of the judicial branch, but whose weakness is in not providing for
a more expeditious method of judicial removal. The same crisis
deluded pragmatist would surrender the judicial branch to the
legislative by the simple device of constitutional amendment
so that the legislature would have the power to prescribe
from time to time the method of selecting judges and their
tenure. This would short-circuit popular sentiment, but we
are told this sugar-coated laxative would achieve "judicial re-
form." It would also convert the judicial branch of government
into a department of the legislative at best and if the legislative
branch is subservient to a strong executive it would at worst
convert our dispute resolving mechanism into a subbranch of the
executive. That was a proposal seriously advocated by well
intentioned lawyers and judges and supported by editorialists
who lamented its temporary demise because they believed, they
said, that we should have a "simple" judicial reform proposal to
make courts more responsive to the people and not structured
for the convenience of judges!
The more sophisticated public of today is not too easily fooled
for any significant length of time. There are better and more
honest ways of selecting judges and the judges recruited would
be more productive and more efficient and more responsive.
Rather than the frenetic cries for more para-judge assistants and
sturdy and continuous application of the principles of Parkinson's
Law, we should be hearing of hard studies of better methods for
selection and retention of judges with built-in protective devices
to assure judicial accountability. The experience of states which
have tried such systems would doubtless reveal bugs as well as
virtues. In my judgment the public wants a sufficient number of
qualified, accountable judges to make the system deliver what
it represents as its reason for existence. The public deserves an
overhaul of the components of the system. If the approach is
truthful and the plan is as workable as knowledgeable men can
make it, and it does not secure public approval, then what more
can be done except admit that the system itself is a luxury that
the modern United States can no longer afford?
Traynor recognized that our ancient house cannot be com-
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pletely cleaned overnight. This then raises the problem of
priorities. The claimed case load problem of the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky may very well not deserve the first priority which is
assigned to it by some. In many instances, a crime is committed,
the defendant is processed through the tier of lower courts, and
his appeal is decided within the same calendar year. Workmen's
compensation appeals are decided in many occasions within thirty
days after the last brief is filed. The case load statistics show
that the hump on the graph is caused by criminal cases and work-
men's compensation cases. As the court processes these cases with
dispatch, the so-called ordinary cases are put back. Intelligent
control measures addressed to the isolated problem are not con-
sidered. The court's reaction is to cry "Look at those unanalyzed
filing statistics. We are lost." The public replies, in effect, "We've
heard that song before" or "Why do you recess so often?" When
one deals with the system itself and its effect on human lives, the
appellate phase proves relatively less important than the critical
necessity of acceptable performance in all the trial courts, how-
ever limited their jurisdiction may be. We must marshall our
priorities and tell the public why and what is coming next and
when.
Although George S. Kaufmnan said that his father advised him
to try everything before he died except incest and folk dancing,
my father was not that permissive. One fact, however, I safely
assert: I have never been invited to give a commencement ad-
dress. I also am persuaded that the panpandrums of the Section
on Judicial Administration of the ABA would never want me to
conduct a seminar. I have more than a suspicion, nevertheless,
that modem physics has not completely invalidated the old
Newtonian principle that for every action there is an equal and
opposite reaction; ergo, for every "quo" a "quid" must be paid.
As we assess the recommended "quos" let us at least fleetingly
consider how much the "quids" cost.
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